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Abstract–This paper examines whether strategic trade behavior can explain the fact that 
the US, Japanese and European Patent Offices – the USPTO, the JPO and the EPO – 
often make different decisions about whether to grant (or reject) a given patent 
application. We analyse this issue by considering whether examination decisions across 
the patent offices vary systematically by inventor nationality, patent quality and 
technology area using a matched sample of 33,305 non-PCT patent applications granted 
by the USPTO and subjected to examination decisions at the EPO and the JPO.  
 
JEL Classification: F13, O31, O34 
 
I.   Introduction 
An invention needs to satisfy three criteria before its inventor(s) can be granted a 
patent: novelty, non-obviousness and utility. These criteria form the basis of the patenting 
threshold which is enshrined in the legislation of all nations which are signatories to the 
World Trade Organization’s Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Matters 
(TRIPS). However, empirical and anecdotal evidence suggests that patent examination 
decisions may vary across patent offices (see Quillen and Webster, 2001).  
Various institutional factors have been shown to affect patent examination decisions. 
Cockburn et al. (2002), for example, have shown that heterogeneous patent examiners 
have significant effects on the breadth of patents granted and that the incentives provided 
by the USPTO to patent examiners influence the patent examination decision. Moreover, 
                                                 
1 Thanks are due to Helene Dernis, Akemi Tokai, and the Industrial Property Digital Library Help Desk 
Staff for assistance with compilation of the dataset and to Andrew Christie, Linda Cohen, John Creedy, 
Stuart Graham, Francis Gurry, Alan Marco, Cecil Quillen, and Kim Weatherall for helpful comments. 
Seminar participants at the 2005 International Industrial Organization Society Conference; the 2005 
Australian Conference of Economists; the European Patent Office; WIPO; and the OECD also provided 
invaluable suggestions. In addition, we are grateful to Bronwyn Hall, Adam Jaffe, and Manuel Trajtenberg 
for provision of their dataset.  
  1resource allocation decisions – including how much time is allocated to search for prior 
art – may affect the quality of patent examination (Merrill et al., 2004). Patent 
examination decisions may also be influenced by strategic trade factors such as favouring 
local patent applications in areas of strong R&D activity (see Linck and McGarry, 1993).  
In this article, we analyse whether patent examination decisions reflect such strategic 
trade behavior using a matched sample of 33,305 single, common priority non-PCT 
patents granted by the USPTO and subject to a final examination decision (i.e. 
grant/reject) by the EPO and the JPO.
2 These three patent offices – known as the trilateral 
patent offices – account for more than 90 per cent of the world’s total patenting activity. 
By using a matched sample of single, common priority patent examination decisions, we 
effectively control for the quality of the invention.
3 Our empirical approach is similar to 
Graham et al. (2002) who use a matched sample of patents to investigate whether EPO 
opposition procedures affect patent quality.  
We use this dataset to analyse how much disharmony exists across the trilateral patent 
offices in terms of their examination decisions. Of those patents granted by the USPTO 
where there is a final examination decision at the other offices, we find that the JPO and 
EPO reject 19.9 per cent and 3.2 per cent respectively. We then examine whether patent 
examination decisions vary systematically by nationality of the inventor, patent quality 
and Revealed Technological Advantage (RTA), which is an index of technological 
specialization in each country. The results suggest that both offices favour local 
applicants in technology areas where domestic patenting activity is strong. 
                                                 
2 Ideally, we would include applications (rather than grants) at the USPTO. However, for the period of the 
study, the USPTO only published information on granted applications.  
3 However, since there is interaction between the applicant and the patent office which we do not observe, it 
is possible that the ex post claims for a common priority patent granted in each office are different. 
Therefore, the patent examination decisions compared here may be for slightly different inventions.  
  2II.  Patent Examination Decisions 
In theory, patents are granted because they satisfy a patent office’s examination of 
their novelty, inventive step and industrial applicability. In a perfect world, this should 
produce the same decision in each office where examination was undertaken. However, 
in practice, patent offices differ in their patent examination protocols. At the USPTO, for 
example, every application filed is assumed to be a request for examination, whereas at 
the EPO and the JPO patent applications are only examined upon request. The EPO also 
has a well-developed system of post-grant oppositions, where objections to patent grant 
decisions can be raised, while the USPTO has an (infrequently used) system of patent re-
examinations (Graham et al., 2002). Moreover, Lemley and Moore (2004) have argued 
that the USPTO’s system of patent continuations makes it almost impossible for a patent 
examiner to ever outrightly reject an application, which provides a perverse incentive to 
grant persistent applicants.  
The existence of these institutional effects raises the possibility that different patent 
offices will make different decisions about an invention’s patentability i.e. a unique 
invention may be granted a patent in one jurisdiction but not another. There is limited 
evidence to suggest that international patent examination decisions differ (see Quillen 
and Webster, 2001).
4 The timing of the examination decision is also important since the 
lag between application and examination dates could be used for strategic reasons.
5 
Regibeau and Rockett (2003), for example, provide a theoretical model demonstrating 
that administrative procedures – such as a patent examinations or new therapeutic drug 
                                                 
4 However, this study only looks at aggregate patent statistics and therefore it is not possible to conclude 
that patent offices make different decisions regarding the same invention. 
5 Although they do not examine strategic behaviour, Popp, Kuhl and Johnson (2003) do find evidence that 
country effects are significant determinants of the lag in USPTO grant decisions. 
  3approvals – can be used to enhance domestic policies by delaying decisions for foreign 
firms relative to their local counterparts. Empirical support for this is provided in 
Dranove and Metzler (1994), who find that there are significant differences in the speed-
to-market for new product launches by foreign versus local pharmaceutical companies. 
Although it is well-known that intellectual property rights affect trade flows between 
developed and developing nations (see Deardorff, 1992; McCalman, 2002; Grossman and 
Lai, 2004), much less is known about the effects of differences in patent regimes on trade 
between developed nations. Some have argued that the JPO uses patents as a non-tariff 
barrier by favoring local patent applicants over foreign applicants or by rejecting patent 
applications by foreign applicants in areas of strong local R&D (Wineberg, 1988; Linck 
and McGarry, 1993). However, the presence of such strategic trade behavior has not been 
verified in a systematic manner.  
The economic effects of different patent examination decisions are profound since 
patents play a well-known role in inducing investment in inventive activity and affecting 
technology transfer. Patent examination decisions are also important indicators of patent 
quality: a patent which has undergone a rigorous examination is much more likely to be 
held valid if later challenged in court, thereby providing greater certainty for investment 
and reducing the effects of costly ex post dispute resolution proceedings (see Jensen and 
Webster, 2004). There is also increasing concern that lower patent examination standards, 
particularly in the US, have resulted in numerous “bad” (i.e. economically undesirable) 
patents (Farrell and Merges, 2004). This potentially has serious adverse effects for the 
rate of innovation since it may result in the creation of patent thickets (see Merges, 1999; 
Shapiro, 2004). 
  4III.  Data and Explanatory Variables 
A. Dataset  Construction 
The data for this study were derived from four main sources:  
(1)  the OECD Triadic Patent Family (TPF) Database;
6  
(2)  the EPO’s public access online database (esp@cenet
7); 
(3)  the JPO’s public access online Industrial Property Digital Library (IPDL) 
databases (Patent & Utility Model Concordance, both English
8 and 
Japanese
9 versions, and the Japanese only database
10; and 
(4)  the NBER Patent-Citations Data File (Hall et al., 2002). 
 
The first database provides us with a list of triadic patent families defined as a set of 
patent applications for which the “priority application must have at least one equivalent 
patent at the EPO, at the USPTO, and at the JPO” (Dernis and Khan, 2004, p.11). To 
control for the individual invention, we only include patent families with a single priority 
application.
11 We constrained the dataset to include patent applications with priority 
years 1990-95 for two reasons. First, it enables us to minimise the amount of data 
truncation with regards to the examination decision, since this provides at least eight 
years to examine the priority application (the data was downloaded in late 2004). Second, 
it enables us to avoid problems associated with the effects of the introduction of the 1988 
Japanese Patent Law reforms.
12 The second and third data sources provide information 
on the status of applications at the EPO and the JPO. 






11 For similar reasons, we also dropped any families involving continuation, continuation-in-parts, or 
divisional patent applications at the USPTO.  
12 See, for example, Sakakibara and Branstetter (2001). 
  5Table 1 shows that the total number of patent applications filed in all three offices 
was 190,583. Eliminating PCT and multiple-priority applications leaves 70,473 
applications, of which 33,305 received a final patent examination decision (i.e. grant or 
reject) by the end of 2004.
13 The remaining 37,168 applications were either still pending 
or had been withdrawn in at least one office.
14 For those applications where a final 
examination decision was made in both offices, there were differences in the decision lag 
(i.e. the length of time between application and examination) for foreign and local 
applicants. At the EPO, the mean decision lag was 4.48 years for local applicants and 
4.96 years for foreign applicants (the two are statistically different). At the JPO, it was 
6.49 years for local applicants and 8.01 years for foreign applicants (once again, the two 
are statistically different).  
TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF COMPLETE PATENT APPLICATIONS IN THE TRILATERAL OFFICES, 
1990-1995 
Office of Application  Complete Patent Families 
1990-1995 
All USPTO applications  843,435 
All EPO applications  433,186 
All JPO applications  2,191,084 
All Triadic Patent Families  190,583 
• PCT families  18,488 
• Non-PCT families  172,095 
-single priority  70,473 
(examination decision in all 3 offices)  (33,305) 
-multiple priorities  101,622 
                                                 
13 The exclusion of PCT applications may lead to a sample selection bias problem since it is probable that 
PCT applications are more valuable than non-PCT applications (applicants only select the PCT route if they 
intend to apply for patents in four or more countries. Given the substantial application costs involved, this 
suggests the inventions also have considerable commercial potential). However, only 10 per cent of patent 
applications in the time period studied here used the PCT route. 
14 The high proportion of withdrawn and pending applications is alarming given the length of time since the 
patent applications were made. It suggests that there is something else going on: perhaps applicants are 
intentionally dragging out the examination process. However, we do not explore this issue here. 
  6We then match-merged the data for these 33,305 patent applications with the NBER 
patent database using the USPTO patent numbers (Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg 2002). 
This enabled us to collect more data on each patent application; data which is not 
available in the triadic patent families database such as application years, number and 
country of inventors, priority countries, number of claims, technology category, and the 
number of citations received.  
B. Explanatory  Variables 
In this section, we provide a summary of the explanatory variables used to examine 
whether patent examination decisions are influenced by strategic trade behavior.
15 To 
proxy for the quality of the patent application (over and above the fact that we are using a 
matched sample), we include as an independent variable the ratio of the number of 
citations received (i.e. forward citations) over the average number of citations received 
for that technology area, year and US inventor status (Citation ratio). Similar to academic 
citations, we postulate that people – applicants, patent attorneys and examiners – find it 
easier to cite the ‘stand out’ publications from the past, and these tend to represent papers 
with the greatest set of new ideas for the time.
16  
In order to determine the relative strength of a country in a specific technology area, a 
revealed technological advantage (RTA) index
17 was constructed for the period 1975 to 
                                                 
15 Table A1 in the appendix summarizes the definition and values of the explanatory variables used. 
16 Other studies – such as Harhoff et al. (1999) and Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004) – have used patent 
citations in similar ways as a proxy for patent value. Our proxy is slightly different in that we control for 
the following: the fact that some technology areas make more citations; that US inventions tend to be more 
cited in the USPTO; and the possible truncation issues associated with the year of application. Not only is 
there a considerable dispersion in the number of citations received in each technology area in our database, 
but patents with US inventors are twice as likely to be cited in USPTO applications as other patents and the 
average number of citations declines with time. Thus, we control for truncation of patent citations, but in a 
different way to Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2005).  
17 Following Archibugi and Pianta (1992) and Huang and Miozzo (2004). 
  71999. This index is a ratio of the proportion of national patent grants from the USPTO in 
a technology area to the proportion of world grants in that technology area. This index, 
which is presented in Table A2, indicates that Europe had a revealed comparative 
advantage in material processing and pharmaceuticals and Japan had a revealed 
comparative advantage in optics and audiovisual technologies. We also constructed 
dummy variables – Local inventor and Foreign inventor – based on whether a local 
inventor was present or not.
18 Thus, the foreign inventor dummy variable represents any 
application that does not have at least one local applicant. US inventor was included to 
test for possible bias for (or against) US nationals. 
To control for differences in prior information, we constructed three dummy 
variables: Prior grant, Prior reject and Prior US grant. The first dummy indicates if the 
application was granted by the other office at an earlier date. That is, when estimating the 
EPO decision, the “other office” is the JPO, and vice versa. The second variable is 
similarly defined, but in this case in terms of a rejection. These dummy variables enable 
us to test whether the knowledge about whether to grant (or reject) a patent application at 
one office influences the examination decision at another office. The last dummy variable 
indicates if the application was granted by the USPTO at a date earlier than the 
examination request dates at both the EPO and at the JPO. 
To control for differences in applicant persistence, we used the number of past 
applications that the applicant had made to each patent office. This variable, Past 
applications, was derived from our dataset and thus only includes past non-PCT triadic 
applications from 1990-95. It will vary however by time, office and application. In 
addition, we include two trend variables, Decision year and Application year. 
                                                 
18 Priority country and country of residence are highly correlated. 
  8C. Descriptive  Statistics 
Table 2 presents data on the characteristics of the patent applications at the EPO and 
the JPO by examination decision and explanatory variable. The first observation is the 
level of disharmony across the two offices: overall, the JPO rejected 19.9 per cent of the 
applications in this dataset, while the EPO rejected 3.2 per cent.
1920 There were, however, 
some consistent patterns across the two offices. In relative terms, for example, the 
rejection rates for patent applications without a local inventor (for both low and high 
RTAs), or with a US inventor, were higher in both offices. However, there is a stark 
difference in the magnitude of the effects across the two offices: the JPO rejected 22.6 
per cent of the applications made with a US inventor, whereas the EPO rejected 5.7 per 
cent. At the EPO, applications with a local inventor had a rejection rate of 1.6 per cent 
compared with a rejection rate of 4.1 per cent for applications without a local inventor. At 
the JPO, local inventors had a rejection rate of 15.1 per cent compared with a non-local 
rejection rate of 22.8 per cent.  
Information from a prior examination decision at another office had a mixed effect: 
information about a prior rejection was negatively related to the grant decision, but 
information about a prior grant was also negatively related. The number of past 
applications also little effect on the likelihood of being granted or rejected in either 
office: regardless of whether the number of past applications filed by the applicant was in 
the first or fourth quartile, the rejection rate ranged from 3.3 to 4.1 per cent in the EPO 
and from 20.7 to 20.8 per cent in the JPO. 
                                                 
19 The observed level of disharmony has important implications for the debate about patent quality: it 
suggests that either the JPO is rejecting “good” patent applications (i.e. committing Type I errors) or that 
the EPO (and the USPTO) are granting “bad” patents (i.e. committing Type II errors). We explore this 
issue in the next section of the paper.  
20 Although we do not present the cross tabulation here, there are only 439 cases (or 1.32 per cent) where 
both the EPO and the JPO rejected patents granted by the USPTO.  
  9TABLE 2: CHARACTERISTICS OF REJECTED PATENT APPLICATIONS, EPO AND JPO 
   EPO  JPO 











Local inventor*low RTA  RTA<μ-σ  3.2 1,201  10.5  1,101 
Foreign inventor*low RTA  RTA<μ-σ  4.8 5,345  21.0  3,015 
         
Local inventor*high RTA  RTA>μ+σ  1.1 2,069  18.4  2,189 
Foreign inventor*high RTA  RTA>μ+σ  4.3 1,973  28.4  2,217 
         
Local inventor  yes  1.6 11,495 15.1  12,356 
 no  4.1 21,810 22.8  20,949 
         
US inventor  yes  5.7 8,786  22.6 23,986 
 no  2.2 23,453 18.9  9,319 
         
Prior grant  yes  2.9 246  27.7  11,613 
 no  3.2 33,059 15.8  21,692 
         
Prior reject  yes  8.3 60  49.3 203 
 no  3.2 33,245 19.8  33,102 
         
Prior grant in US  yes  4.6 8,833  22.5 22,297 
 no  2.7 23,406 14.7  11,008 
         
Local inventor*Citation ratio  1
st quartile  1.5 2,879  15.7  3,092 
Foreign inventor*Citation ratio  1
st quartile  4.3 5,438  24.2  5,236 
         
Local inventor*Citation ratio  4
th quartile  1.7 2,874  13.1  3,084 
Foreign inventor*Citation ratio  4
th quartile  3.3 5,450  20.0  5,237 
         
Past applications  1
st quartile  3.3 8,258  20.7  8,258 
 4
th quartile  4.1 8,258  20.8  8,258 
         
TOTAL   3.2 33,305 19.9  33,305 
 
IV.  Model and Estimation Results 
In this paper, we argue that the decision to grant application i depends on the quality 
of the invention (q), strategic trade behavior (s), other influences (X) and a random error 
term (ε). Accordingly, if y is the examination decision: 







rejected)   if   on (applicati   0 *   if   0
granted)   is   on (applicati   0 *   if   1
y
y
yi   
where  β is the associated vector of parameters to be estimated. Assuming 
[] () [ ] ( ) β β i i i i i i X s q X s q X s q y exp 1 / exp ) , , | 0 * Pr( + = > , equation (1) can be estimated 
as a binary logit model (Greene, 2003).
21  
We estimated equation (1) separately for both the EPO and the JPO. Table 3 presents 
the estimated coefficients and marginal effects for each of the separate patent office 
equations. Using Harhoff et al.’s (1992) interpretation of forward citations as a proxy for 
patent value, our results show that patent value matters, especially in the JPO where both 
Citation ratio coefficients were positively related to the probability of a patent 
application being granted. The size of the effect at the JPO was greater for local inventors 
than for foreign inventors, suggesting that there is a systematic bias towards local 
inventors. However, the fact that invention value matters for both locals and foreigners 
suggests that the JPO does a good job in granting meritorious patent applications. The 
situation at the EPO is somewhat different. Although valuable patent applications from 
foreign inventors had a higher probability of patent grant, ceteris paribus, patent quality 
had no statistically significant effect on the probability of patent grant for local inventors.  
This result has relevance for the debate about whether patent offices (particularly the 
USPTO) grant “bad” patents. Patent offices may be inclined to commit such Type II 
errors because of the revenue generated by patent applicant fees, or because they do not 
have adequate resources to examine the applications fully. On the other hand, patent 
offices may also have an incentive to commit a Type I error (i.e. reject a valuable patent 
application) since this enables local manufacturers and researchers to use important 
                                                 
21 Equation (1) could also be estimated as a binary probit, as in Guellec and van Pottelsberghe (2000). 
  11inventions in the domestic market without having to negotiate a license. If the citation 
ratio is a reasonable proxy for determining the minimum patentability threshold, our 
results imply that the JPO is not making Type I errors since patent granting decisions are 
strongly influenced by patent value. At the same time, it suggests that the EPO (and the 
USPTO) are possibly committing Type II errors since patent value is not an important 
determinant of patent granting decisions, particularly for local inventors.
22
TABLE 3: COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES AND MARGINAL EFFECTS, EPO AND JPO, CROSS-
SECTIONAL MODELS 
Determinants  EPO Decision  JPO Decision 
 Coeff.  SE  dy/dx  Coeff.  SE  dy/dx 
QUALITY          
Local inventor*Citation ratio  -0.038 0.051  -0.10  0.157***  0.024  2.34 
Foreign inventor*Citation ratio  0.107*** 0.034  0.27 0.092*** 0.015  1.37 
STRATEGIC TRADE           
Local inventor*RTA  0.906*** 0.136  2.30 -0.092***  0.033  -1.38 
Foreign inventor*RTA  0.197* 0.113  0.50  -0.320***  0.031  -4.79 
US inventor  -0.665*** 0.080  -1.96 -0.094*** 0.036  -1.42 
CONTROL VARIABLES           
Prior grant  0.645 0.392  1.22  -0.202***  0.039  -3.09 
Prior reject  -0.532 0.476  -1.74  -1.174***  0.147  -23.65 
Prior US grant  -0.045 0.078  -0.12  0.064 0.040  0.97 
Past applications  -0.310*** 0.080  -0.79 0.042  0.046  0.63 
Decision year  0.136*** 0.013  0.34 -0.194***  0.007  -2.91 
Application year  -0.081*** 0.022  -0.20 0.116*** 0.010  1.74 
Constant  2.210 0.170   3.334 0.079   
           
log(likelihood)  -4,489    -15,724    
pseudo-R
2  0.049    0.055    
Prob[Grant]  0.974    0.817    
sample size  33,305     33,305    
*** (significant at 1% level), ** (significant at 5% level), * (significant at 10% level) 
Note: The base group consists of applications which have been granted at the USPTO at a date later than 
any substantive examination at the EPO or JPO. 
 
The coefficients for the two interacted strategic trade effects highlight some 
interesting patterns across the two offices. At the EPO and the JPO, local inventors in a 
given technology area are more likely to be granted a patent than a foreign applicant, but 
                                                 
22 A more exhaustive analysis of this issue – which is outside the scope of this study, but is the subject of 
current research –considers other ways to analyse this, such as whether those patent applications rejected 
by the JPO resulted in patent renewals in the other offices.  
  12the effect is larger at the JPO, where the average difference between the marginal effects 
for local and foreign applicants is 3.41 percentage points. The two offices are also 
unanimous in their treatment of patent applications from US inventors: in both cases, US 
inventor is negative and statistically significant suggesting that both the EPO and the JPO 
are much less likely to grant an application from a US inventor (however, at 1.96 and 
1.42 percentage points respectively, the effect is fairly modest in size).  
With respect to the control variables, earlier decisions at other jurisdictions seem to 
be important mainly at the JPO. For example, on average, Prior reject in the JPO 
estimation is negative and significant, suggesting that applications which have been 
rejected at the EPO when the JPO begins its examination process have a much lower 
likelihood of being granted by the JPO. However, prior grants in the US have no 
significant effect on either of the other offices. And prior grants by the EPO have a 
negative effect on the probability of grant at the JPO, which seems somewhat counter-
intuitive. Past applications was only significant at the EPO, but was negatively signed 
suggesting that applicant persistence does not have an effect on examination decisions.
23  
One of the strongest results is that both offices show clear preferences for local 
inventors relative to foreign inventors. To understand how these preferences vary across 
technology areas, we provide some results on the marginal advantage for local (vis-à-vis 
foreign) inventors by technology area in Table 4. This measure was constructed by taking 
the difference between the marginal effects on the interaction terms Local inventor*RTA 
                                                 
23 To further test examine whether applicant behavior affects the examination decision, we estimated a 
fixed-effects model – not reported here – with the assignee as the fixed effect. We found that the fixed 
effects explained about half of the variation in the grant decision and that these fixed effects were 
correlated to the local and foreign inventor variables interacted with RTAs in a way which was consistent 
with the results in Table 3. 
  13and  Foreign inventor*RTA in each technology area in each office while holding the 
citation ratio, for local and foreign inventors, constant at the mean.  
TABLE 4: MARGINAL ADVANTAGE FOR LOCAL INVENTORS IN TERMS OF THE PROBABILITY 
OF A GRANT, EPO AND JPO, BY TECHNOLOGY AREA 
 
Technology Area (OST)  Marginal Advantage for Local Inventors 
 Japan  Europe 
 (%)  Ranking  (%)  Ranking 
Optics  8.9 1  0.9 28 
Audiovisual technology  8.7 2  1.0  29 
Engines pump turbine  5.8 6  2.1  10 
Semiconductors  7.5 3  0.9  30 
Material processing  4.0 14 2.8  2 
Materials metallurgy  4.9 8  2.2 7 
Telecommunications  5.9 5. 1.4  25 
Organic fine chemicals  3.5 21 2.9 1 
Mechanical element  3.9 16 2.3  6 
Macromolecular polymers  4.9 9  2.1  11 
Surfaces coatings  5.1 7  1.7  21 
Mechanical tool  3.7 17 2.2  8 
Electrical devices  4.8 10 1.6 22 
Transport  4.3 12 1.8 18 
Nuclear engineering  3.7 20 2.4  5 
Pharmaceuticals  3.1 24 2.7  3 
Environment pollution  3.9 15 1.9 15 
Miscellaneous unclassified  4.4 11 1.8 19 
Basic chemical processes, petroleum  3.3 23 2.5  4 
Handling printing  3.7 19 2.0 12 
Analysis/measurement  4.2 13 1.7 20 
General processes  3.0 26 2.1  9 
Thermal techniques  3.4 22 1.8 16 
Information technology  6.0 4  0.9 31 
Agriculture food  3.0 25 1.9 14 
Biotechnology  3.7 18 1.8 16 
Civil engineering, building, mining  1.9 30 1.6 23 
Consumer goods equipment  2.5 27 1.2 27 
Agriculture food machinery  2.1 29 1.4 26 
Space technology weapons  1.3 31 2.0 13 
Medical engineering  2.4 28 1.4 24 
Notes: OST is the Observatoire des Sciences et des Technologies patent catergorization system. 
 
The advantage for local inventors in lowly-ranked RTAs was small (0.9 per cent for 
semiconductors and information technology in the EPO, and 1.3 per cent for space 
  14technology weapons in the JPO). However, it was much more substantial in the highest-
ranked RTAs, particularly at the JPO. For example, local inventors with patent 
applications in the highest-ranked technological specialization area in Europe – organic 
fine chemicals – were 2.9 per cent more likely than foreigners to receive a grant, ceteris 
paribus, at the EPO. However, local inventors in highest-ranked technological 
specialization area in Japan – optics –received an 8.9 per cent advantage over non-locals 
at the JPO. Overall, this indicates that Japan is much more likely than Europe to give an 
advantage to local inventors in areas of importance to the domestic economy.  
 
V. Conclusion 
This papers looks at the whether national strategic trade factors are a determinant of 
patent examination decisions at the trilateral patent offices. The empirical model is 
estimated using a newly constructed data set of 33,305 non-PCT patent applications 
granted by the USPTO and subjected to final examination decisions at the EPO and the 
JPO. We then compare the pattern of examination decisions at the EPO and the JPO 
across inventor nationality, area of technological specialization and patent value.  
This study makes a number of important contributions to the literature. First, it 
provides new evidence on the level of disharmony in international patent office 
examination decisions. Prior to this study, little attempt has been made to explain the 
existence of the observed cross-country/region variations in patent examination decisions 
while controlling for the objective quality of the underlying invention (see Lerner 2002). 
This is rather surprising given the importance of the patent examination decision on the 
ex ante investment decision and the recent debate on international harmonization of 
  15patent policy. The results also suggest that – despite the fact that the JPO rejects a lot 
more patent applications than the EPO – it consistently grants patents which have 
economic value.  
Second, we examine the pattern of examination decisions across technology areas. 
We find strong evidence that examination decisions at both the EPO and the JPO do 
depend on strategic trade factors. While both offices give preferential treatment to local 
inventors, ceteris paribus, the advantage is greatest for applications in their strongest 
areas of technological specialization, especially in Japan. The converse of this is that it is 
harder for foreign applicants to get a patent in each jurisdiction’s dominant R&D areas. 
Such discrimination provides assistance to local researchers and manufacturers since they 
are able to use these inventions without licensing from the patent owners. 
 
REFERENCES 
Archibugi, D. and Pianta, M., The Technological Specialization of Advanced Countries 
(Kluwer Academic, Dordrecht, 1992). 
Cockburn I. M., Kortum, S. and Stern, S., “Are all Patent Examiners Equal? The Impact 
of Examiner Characteristics”, NBER Working Paper W8980 (2002). 
Deardorff, A.V., “Welfare Effects of Global Protection”, Economica 59 (1992), 35-51. 
Dernis, H. and Khan, M., “Triadic Patent Families Methodology”, STI Working Paper 
2004/2, OECD: Paris. 
Dranove, D. and Metzler, D., “Do Important Drugs Reach the Market Sooner?”, RAND 
Journal of Economics 25:3 (1994), 402-423. 
Farrell, J. and Merges, R.P., “Incentives to Challenge and Defend Patents: Why 
Litigation Won’t Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative 
Patent Review Might Help”, Berkeley Technology Law Journal 19:3 (2004), 
943-970. 
  16Greene, W.H., Econometric Analysis (Fifth Edition, MacMillan, New York, 2003). 
Guellec, D. and van Pottelsberghe, B., “Applications, Grants and the Value of Patent,” 
Economics Letters 69 (2000), 109-114. 
Graham, S.J.H., Hall, B.H., Harhoff, D. and Mowery, D.C., “Post-Issue Patent 'Quality 
Control': A Comparative Study of U.S. Patent Re-examinations and European 
Patent Oppositions”, NBER Working Paper W8807 (2002). 
Grossman, G.M. and Lai, E.L.C., “International Protection of Intellectual Property”, 
American Economic Review 94:5 (2004), 1635-1653. 
Hall, B.H., A.B. Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, M., “The NBER Patent Citations Data File: 
Lessons, Insights, and Methodological Tools”, in A. B. Jaffe and M. Trajtenberg 
(eds.),  Patents, Citations, and Innovations: A Window on the Knowledge 
Economy (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2002).  
Hall, B.H., Jaffe, A. and Trajtenberg, M., “Market Value and Patent Citations”, RAND 
Journal of Economics 36 (2005), 16-38. 
Harhoff, D., Narin, F., Scherer, F.M. and Vopel, K., “Citation Frequency and the Value 
of Patented Inventions”, Review of Economics and Statistics 81:3 (1999), 511-
515. 
Huang, H-T and Miozzo, M., “Patterns of Technological Specialization in Latin 
American and East Asian countries: An Analysis of Patents and Trade Flows”, 
Economics of Innovation and New Technology 13:7 (2004), 615-653. 
Jensen, P.H. and Webster, E., “Achieving the Optimal Power of Patent Rights”, 
Australian Economic Review 37:4 (2004), 419-426. 
Lanjouw, J.O. and Schankerman, M., “Protecting Intellectual Property Rights: Are Small 
Firms Handicapped?”, Journal of Law and Economics 47:1 (2004), 45-74. 
Lerner, J., “150 Years of Patent Office Practice”, American Economic Review  92:2 
(2002), 307-330. 
Lemley, M.A. and Moore, K.A., “Abolishing Patent Continuations”, Boston Law Review 
84 (2004). 
Linck, N.J. and McGarry, J.E., “Patent Procurement and Enforcement in Japan – A Trade 
Barrier”, George Washington Journal of International Law and Economics 27 
(1993), 411-431. 
  17McCalman, P., “National Patents, Innovation and International Agreements”, Journal of 
International Trade & Economic Development 11:1 (2002), 1-14. 
Merges, R.P., “As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for 
Business Concepts and Patent System Reform”, Berkeley Technology Law Journal 
14 (1999), 577-615. 
Merrill, S.A., Levin, R.C. and Myers, M.B., A Patent System for the 21
st Century, 
Committee on Intellectual Property Rights in the Knowledge-Based Economy, 
National Research Council (National Academies Press, 2004). 
Popp, D., Juhl, T. and Johnson, D.K.N., “Time in Purgatory: Determinants of the Grant 
Lag for US Patent Applications”, NBER Working Paper W9518. 
Quillen, C.D. and Webster, O.H., “Continuing Patent Applications and Performance of 
the U.S. Patent Office”, Federal Circuit Bar Journal 11:1 (2001), 1-21. 
Regibeau, P. and Rockett, K., “Administrative Delays as Barriers to Trade”, unpublished 
mimeo dated June 2003, University of Sussex. 
Sakakibara, M. and Branstetter, L., “Do Stronger Patents Induce More Innovation? 
Evidence from the 1988 Japanese Patent Law Reforms”, RAND Journal of 
Economics 32:1 (2001), 77-100. 
Shapiro, C., “Patent System Reform: Economic Analysis and Critique”, Berkeley 
Technology Law Journal 19:3 (2004), 1017-1047. 
Wineberg, A., “The Japanese Patent System: A Non-Tariff Barrier to Foreign 
Businesses?” Journal of World Trade Law 22:1 (1988), 11-22. 
  18APPENDIX 






date) grant    an earlier th (or    filled   is   date reject    (JPO)   EPO    the if    0






otherwise    0






otherwise    0






otherwise    0
US    the in   is   address   s inventor' any    if    1
 
Past applications  Number of past applications (/1000) made by an assignee at each patent office 




otherwise    0
date request    exam   (JPO)   EPO     date grant    US    the if    1
 
Citation ratio 
Citations received for each application/average citations made at the USPTO in the 





otherwise    0






otherwise    0
inventors   local   no   has   n applicatio   an   if    1
 
Decision year  The year of the decision (grant/reject) at the EPO (JPO), 1990=1 
Application year  The year of the filing of the application at the EPO (JPO), 1990=1 
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TABLE A2: TECHNOLOGICAL SPECIALIZATION IN THE US, JAPAN AND EUROPE, 1975-99 






Optics 0.710  2.303  0.667 
Audiovisual  technology  0.742 2.250 0.554 
Engines  pump  turbine  0.812 1.395 1.168 
Semiconductors  0.819 1.910 0.480 
Material  processing  0.835 0.893 1.575 
Materials  metallurgy  0.848 1.155 1.247 
Telecommunications  0.926 1.450 0.769 
Organic fine chemicals  0.934  0.746  1.601 
Mechanical  element  0.950 0.842 1.267 
Macromolecular  polymers  0.964 1.138 1.157 
Surfaces coatings  0.977 1.192 0.961 
Mechanical  tool  0.979 0.800 1.197 
Electrical  devices  0.982 1.126 0.904 
Transport  0.985 0.977 1.004 
Nuclear  engineering  0.990 0.786 1.338 
Pharmaceuticals 1.004 0.627 1.487 
Environment  pollution  1.011 0.852 1.045 
Miscellaneous  unclassified  1.017 0.983 0.995 
Basic chemical processes, petroleum  1.020  0.671  1.382 
Handling  printing  1.023 0.788 1.117 
Analysis/measurement  1.044 0.934 0.967 
General  processes  1.058 0.585 1.185 
Thermal  techniques  1.062 0.698 1.012 
Information technology  1.064  1.473  0.475 
Agriculture  food  1.126 0.590 1.073 
Biotechnology  1.138 0.797 1.012 
Civil engineering, building, mining  1.203  0.271  0.903 
Consumer goods equipment  1.229  0.446  0.681 
Agriculture  food  machinery  1.241 0.327 0.756 
Space technology weapons  1.251  0.095  1.112 
Medical  engineering  1.298 0.398 0.777 
Notes: RTA is the number of country applications to the USPTO in each OST technology area as a proportion of the total 
number of country applications to the USPTO expressed as a ratio of all applications to the USPTO in each OST 
technology are as a proportion of all applications to the USPTO. 
Source: NBER database. 
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